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Aerial warfare existed in some form long 
before the First World War, but it was during the 
First World War that aerial warfare really became 
common. The First World War saw the use of bi- 
planes, tri-planes, and zeppelins as weapons to 
instil fear, inflict damage, and control the skies. 
After the First World War had ended it became 
clear that in future conflicts it would be essential 
to obtain air superiority. During the interwar 
period between World War I and World War II, 
nations including Britain, the United States, and 
Germany (though later in time due to the 
restrictions placed upon them in the treaty of 
Versailles) began to assemble formidable air 
forces as well as develop air doctrine to prepare 
themselves for future conflict. The issue was that 
air warfare at this level was new and strategists 
lacked the knowledge that we have today.  It was 
a popular belief among the Allied nations that 
bombers could be sent on missions unescorted and 
return home safely. This belief was put to the test, 
and after sustaining high loss rates both the British 
and Americans came to the conclusion that this 
logic was flawed. While the British decided to 
pursue night raids, the Americans focused more on 
using long-range fighter escorts with their 
bombers. This essay will determine the impact 
that long range fighter escorts had on the Allied 
daylight bombing raids on Germany during the 
Second World War by examining pre-war 
doctrine, early war doctrine, late war doctrine, the 
Hamburg raids in 1943, the two Schweinfurt raids 
that followed the Hamburg raids in 1943, Big 
Week in early 1944, the Dresden raids in 
February, 1945, and two of the American Berlin 
raids (March 6th, 1944 and March 24th, 1945). 
Fighter escorts played a crucial role in protecting 
Allied bombers, and they drastically reduced loss 
rates on bombing missions. Due to the fact that 
the British switched their focus to night raids 
fairly early in the war, this essay will focus 
primarily on American raids; however, there will 
be some attention given to the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) daylight raids that were attempted in the 
first half of the war. 
After the end of the First World War, it was 
clear that aerial warfare would be a major part of 
future warfare. Therefore, military strategists 
began to develop doctrine to be prepared for future 
conflict. Pre-World War II air doctrine primarily 
focused on bombers rather than fighters. This 
doctrine was based on experiences from the First 
World War, which, due to technological 
innovations, did not go well for early strategic 
bombing operations during the Second World 
War. Pre-World War II doctrine focused on 
strategic bombing, and it was thought that 
bombers could complete their missions and return 
to base with limited casualties without fighter 
escorts. The reasons for this were understandable 
at the time. During the First World War the 
performance of bombers often exceeded the 
performance of fighters.1 Furthermore, radar was 
not used in the First World War, and ground-to-air 
communication was difficult, so early detection of 
bombers and relaying information to fighters was 
difficult. During the First World War "fighter 
scouts had to fly sweeps over large areas in the 
hope of finding bombers–a practice that was 
difficult in the daytime, and doubly difficult at 
night. This made it possible, though risky, for 
bombers to operate without escorts to defend 
them."2 
Of course, as the interwar years progressed, 
technology became far more advanced. Radar was 
available during the Second World War and 
ground-to-air communications were also being 
used. This allowed defending nations time to 
scramble interceptors before bombers could reach 
their target. It also allowed attacks to be better 
coordinated and more effective.3 According to 
Gordon Musgrove, air defenses were typically 
given a 30-minute and 15-minute alert signal.4 
This was plenty of time for interceptors to get into 
the air and take up a strategic position to attack the 
enemy bombers. 
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Aircraft had also become much more 
advanced during the interwar years, and bombers 
were no longer superior to fighters. When 
comparing the statistics of the Messerschmitt (Me) 
109, a common German fighter plane, to a B-17 
flying fortress, a common American bomber, it is 
clear that fighters had the upper hand in combat. 
The Me 109 was faster, much more agile, and 
could fly higher than the B-17.5  The only chance 
a B-17 without fighter escort stood against a Me 
109 was its 11-13 .50 caliber machine gun turrets, 
though they were not very accurate.6 Bombers 
did have a much farther range than fighters, but 
this did not help bombers defensively. In fact, it 
could be argued that it hindered their defense, as 
this meant that strategists thought that long-range 
fighter escorts were not feasible. Despite these 
changes in technology, the British, and later the 
Americans made the decision that long-range 
fighter escorts were not necessary or even feasible. 
They chose to base their decisions on the 
performance of fighters and bombers from the 
First World War, as well as the difficulty of 
increasing the range of fighters. This decision 
would cost many bomber crews their lives. 
After the outbreak of the Second World War, 
the British wasted no time beginning their 
bombing campaign against the Germans. At the 
request of the French government, as well as the 
President of the United States Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, the British agreed not to bomb 
Germany itself, but rather to focus on naval 
targets. Their campaign involved sending 
Wellingtons unescorted to bomb their targets. 
 
On December 14, twelve Wellingtons 
patrolling off the German coast ran into 
fighters….Five Wellingtons went down 
and another crashed on landing. The 
planes that returned home claimed to have 
shot down one German fighter. The RAF 
again wrongly attributed most or all of its 
losses to flak7. 
 
That was a loss rate of forty-two percent (fifty 
percent if the bomber that crashed on landing is 
included).  During the Second World War, any 
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loss rate above five percent was not sustainable.8 
Aircraft production was not at its highest during 
the early years of the war, so replacing planes and 
crew was difficult. A loss rate of more than five 
percent meant that the RAF was losing more 
planes and crew than they could replace. Though 
the British suffered an extremely high loss rate, 
the British decided to try again just four days later. 
"On December 18th, twenty-four Wellingtons went 
out. Two turned back; the Germans detected the 
rest on radar.… Then the German fighters closed 
in. Only ten returned home; two German fighters 
went down."9 Excluding the two that turned back, 
the British lost 12 of 22 bombers which is a loss 
rate of fifty-five percent. "There was no doubt, 
this time, that fighters had caused the terrible 
losses. If this episode was typical, daylight attacks 
on inland German targets without escort would be 
suicidal."10 The British knew that they could not 
continue unescorted daylight bombing raids as 
these loss figures were not sustainable. 
Ultimately, the British had three options: 
 
It must give up strategic bombing 
altogether, use long-range escort, or resort 
to night bombing. The first choice 
seemed unthinkable while the second 
seemed to be foreclosed by fundamental 
engineering factors. Any fighter carrying 
enough fuel to accompany bombers to a 
distant target, it was believed, would be 
too heavy and maneuverable to deal with 
enemy interceptors…Night operations 
seemed the only choice.11 
 
There was, perhaps, another aspect that came into 
play when deciding how to reduce bomber loss 
rates. Bernard Boylan suggests that the decision 
to switch to night raids was made fairly easily 
because of the British "belief in the effectiveness 
of  area  bombing."12 The British continued 
daylight bombing raids into 1941, but it soon 
became apparent that they were fighting a losing 
battle. The Butt Report was released in 1941, and 
its findings showed the grim reality of British 
unescorted daylight bombing. According to the 
report, only one in five bombers could put their 
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bombs   within   five   miles   of   their   target.13 
Obviously changes had to be made. 
The British had learned the hard way that 
unescorted daylight bombing raids would result in 
high casualties, and they were determined not to 
let the Americans make the same mistake. The 
Prime Minister himself addressed Mr. Harry 
Hopkins, an advisor to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, warning  him of the dangers  of 
unescorted daylight bombing raids, and warning 
him of the urgency of producing Mustang fighters 
with Merlin and later Griffon Engines. The 
message, dated 16 October 1942, stated: 
 
I must also say to you for your eye alone 
and only to be used by you in your high 
discretion that the very accurate results so 
far achieved in the daylight bombing of 
France by your fortresses under most 
numerous Fighter escort mainly British, 
does not give our experts the same 
confidence as yours in the power of the 
day bomber to operate far into Germany. 
We do not think the claims of the Fighters 
shot down by Fortresses are correct 
though made with complete sincerity, and 
the dangers of daylight bombing will 
increase terribly once outside Fighter 
protection as the range lengthens.14 
 
It was clear that unescorted daylight bombing 
raids were not feasible. The British had learned 
this the hard way and they wanted to prevent the 
United States from suffering the same fate as they 
had. 
Unfortunately, the minds of United States 
Army Air Force (USAAF) policy makers were 
clouded by hubris towards the capabilities of their 
B-17 Flying Fortress bomber. The Americans 
strongly believed in the defensive capabilities of 
the B-17 flying  fortress. The  B-17 had self- 
sealing fuel tanks and was designed to be able to 
run on only one of its four engines,15 which were 
useful design features in combat as the probability 
of sustaining damage was extremely high. The B- 
17 was armed with several machine gun turrets, 
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and the thought was that if the B-17s flew in a 
tight formation they would be able to defend 
themselves against incoming enemy fighters by 
unleashing a wall of machine gun fire on incoming 
enemy fighter pilots. This was what  bomber 
crews were taught during training. Corps Tactical 
School suggested: 
 
Bombardment formations may suffer 
defeat at the hands of hostile pursuit, but 
with a properly constituted formation, 
efficiently flown, these defeats will be the 
exception rather than the rule. Losses 
may be expected, but these losses will be 
minimized by proper defensive tactics. 
 
The bombardment text in 1935 also stated "escort 
fighters will neither be provided nor requested 
unless experience proves that bombardment  is 
unable to penetrate such resistance alone." As one 
instructor put it, "A well-planned and well- 
conducted bombardment attack, once launched, 
can not be stopped." By the late 1930s, the Army 
Air Corps doctrine in the school accepted 
assumptions that narrowly focused the role of a 
self-defending heavy bomber into an operational 
concept of high altitude, daylight precision 
bombing based upon the performance differences 
between the bomber and fighter at the time.16 This 
logic was flawed as it was very difficult, if not 
impossible, for all B-17s to remain in formation 
once engaged by interceptors. The Luftwaffe had 
employed rockets on their interceptors, which, 
while inaccurate, were effective formation busters. 
Luftwaffe pilots would fire these rockets into 
bomber formations, which would cause bombers 
to break off from their formation. Interceptor 
pilots could then pick them off at will. 
Furthermore, flying in formation had its own 
risks as well, not from interceptors, but from flak. 
Flak was a ground to air cannon with exploding 
rounds. If a target was important to the German 
war effort, it would, at the very least, be protected 
by flak, and bombers flying in tight formation 
were much easier to hit as they provided a bigger 
target as opposed to bombers that were spread 
apart.17 
Aside from warning the Americans about the 
necessity of developing long-range fighter escorts, 
the British also tried to persuade the Americans 
into joining them in the practice of night raids. 
This resulted in the Casablanca conference being 
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called in January 1943. The purpose of the 
Casablanca conference was to explore all the 
possibilities of Anglo-American co-operation, 
including strategic bombing. Not surprisingly, the 
Americans and the British did not initially agree. 
Despite the warnings from the British, the 
Americans remained adamant that their bombers 
could penetrate deep into Germany, bomb their 
targets, and return to base while incurring a 
minimal casualty rate. Though the Americans 
refused to join the British in night bombing (likely 
due to Roosevelt's opposition to area bombing and 
the Norden bombsight's ineffectiveness in the 
dark), this stubbornness did present an appealing 
opportunity. With the British bombing at night, 
and the Americans bombing during the day, the 
Allies could be bombing targets in Germany at all 
times. "The conference agreed that a combined 
bomber offensive should be the aim."18 The 
Casablanca conference was an important step in 
the Allied bombing campaign during the Second 
World War as the combined bomber offensive put 
a massive strain on German air defences.19 
With their now combined offensive, the RAF 
and Eighth Air Force began to plan their next 
targets. They decided to attack the German city of 
Hamburg. The code name for this operation was 
Operation Gomorrah. Hamburg was Germany's 
second largest city and Europe's largest port.20 
Hamburg was of high value to Germany during 
the Second World War. 
 
The industries in Hamburg were a major 
factor in German war production and 
included  aircraft  plants,  a  variety  of 
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1944/5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 44-45. 
machinery plants, and shipyards. The 
latter produced more than a third of all the 
U-boats built in Germany during the war. 
It also contained oil plants and refineries 
which were vital in creating lubricants.21 
 
The RAF and Eighth Air Force had a number of 
serious issues that could have potentially turned 
Operation Gomorrah into a disaster. The first 
issue was the serious risk that the Americans were 
taking. Ignoring all advice from the British, the 
Eighth Air Force was sending in a fleet of 
bombers unescorted by long-range fighters in 
broad daylight. The second issue concerning the 
United States was that they did not have enough 
bombers to hit all  of the  designated targets.22 
Furthermore, the RAF was having trouble hitting 
their targets at night, yet, despite these issues, the 
raid went ahead as the Strategic Bombing Survey 
deemed that the potential damage that could be 
done to Germany would be catastrophic for their 
war effort.23  The city of Hamburg was bombed 
either at night, day, or sometimes both, from July 
24th to July 30th 1943 and then again on August 2 
to August 3 1943.24 Despite not having fighter 
escorts, the loss rates for the Hamburg raids were 
quite low, well below the five percent that was 
acceptable. Furthermore, most of the city was 
destroyed. The combination of very dry, hot, 
windy weather and the incendiary bombs dropped 
by the Allies created a firestorm that killed an 
estimated 45,000 people and destroyed 
approximately fifty-six percent of the city's 
residential units as well as 436 public buildings.25 
The Americans had ignored the warnings from the 
British by sending in their bombers unescorted 
during the day, yet unlike the British, they did not 
suffer the same high casualty rates that the British 
suffered during the first two years of the war. The 
reason for this was not the defensive capabilities 
of the B-17 bomber, but rather luck. 
Most of the sorties flown during the Hamburg 
raids were in perfect weather for bombing. 
Secondly, there had been issues with the German 
detection systems. Gordon Musgrove provides an 
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account of these troubles: 
 
The sirens had sounded at 1440 but it 
proved to be a false alarm. Suddenly, 
however, the drone of bomber engines 
could be heard to the south of the river. 
There had been no air-raid warning and 
the defences had not received the usual 
30-minute and 15-minute alert signals, 
nor indeed any advance warning that 
enemy aircraft were approaching.26 
 
This meant that German interceptors did not have 
the usual time to get airborne and take up a tactical 
position to be able to effectively engage the 
approaching enemy bombers. The issues with the 
German detection systems can be attributed to the 
use of WINDOW.27 WINDOW is a defensive 
tactic which involves tossing stacks of metal foil, 
which were cut to be about 25cms in length, from 
the bombers while they were in the air.28 These 
pieces of metal appeared on radar, making it near 
impossible for radar operators to locate planes. 
This helped to contribute to the success of the 
Hamburg raids; however, it did not take the 
Germans very long to figure out how to deal with 
WINDOW. Though the use of WINDOW proved 
to be effective, it cannot be solely credited for the 
survival rate of the bombers. 
Both the Americans and the British were 
lucky in terms of the number of fighters that were 
available in the area, which were surprisingly low. 
Given the importance of the city of Hamburg to 
the German war effort, one would think that the 
city would have been protected by large numbers 
of fighters. The bombing of Hamburg definitely 
did not help to reinforce the notion that the 
Americans needed to develop and implement 
long-range fighter escorts, but luck would not 
always be on their side, as proven by the 
Schweinfurt raids. 
The Americans had planned two separate raids 
on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, code name: 
Operation Pointblank. The Americans suffered 
horrific losses on both of these raids. The cities of 
Schweinfurt and Regensburg had factories that 
produced large numbers of ball bearings. Ball- 
bearings were essential components of machinery, 
particularly in their engines of vehicles such as 
trucks, tanks and air planes. It was thought that if 
the RAF or the Eighth Air Force could eliminate 
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the German supply of ball bearings, or at least 
severely hinder it, then they would reduce the 
number of German aircraft in the sky and the 
Allies would then gain air superiority. For this 
reason, Schweinfurt and Regensburg were chosen 
as targets. Schweinfurt was attacked two separate 
times. The first Schweinfurt raid took place on 
August 17, 1943 and the second, known as Second 
Schweinfurt, took place on October 14, 1943, a 
day that became known as 'Black Thursday.'29 
The first raid consisted of 376 unescorted bombers 
dispatched and 315 that found their target. Of the 
315 bombers that left for Schweinfurt and 
Regensburg, 60 were lost due to the Luftwaffe.30 
This translates to a loss rate of approximately 
nineteen percent. Despite the high loss rates, the 
Eighth Air Force decided to try raiding 
Schweinfurt again in the month of October. This 
time, the bombers were escorted by fighters; 
however, they were not yet equipped to be long- 
range fighter escorts (i.e. no drop tanks). 
Therefore, they had to turn back before the 
bombers reached Schweinfurt. The results of 
second Schweinfurt were even more grim than the 
first raid. Out of 291 B-17s that left for 
Schweinfurt, 60 were lost.31 This translates into a 
loss rate of approximately twenty-one percent. 
Initially, these numbers were not known to the 
Eighth Air Force, but once they were, Ira Eaker, 
commander of the Eight Air Force, knew that 
changes had to be made, as they showed the harsh 
reality of the consequences of sending bombers 
into enemy air space unescorted by long-range 
fighter escorts. The findings of these statistics 
were that "unescorted bombers took seven times 
the loss plus two-and-a-half times the damage and 
the final assessment revealed that Eighth Bomber 
Command experienced the loss of one-third of its 
heavy bombers each month."32 The accounts of 
bomber crews who flew in the Schweinfurt raids 
show the desperate need for long-range fighter 
escorts. A bomb group commander who flew in 
the first Schweinfurt mission said, "It was like 
lining up the cavalry, shooting your way in and 
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then shooting your way out again."33 Another had 
said, "We had no trouble until the P-47s left, then 
all hell broke loose. Between the Rhine and the 
target our formations were attacked by at least 300 
enemy aircraft."34  Bombers who flew in the 
Schweinfurt raids faced unnecessarily high 
numbers of fighters. This should have been 
expected. After the Hamburg raids, the Germans 
realized just how vulnerable they were, and took 
steps to augment their defenses, which the 
Americans were aware of, however, they were 
clearly too late to act on it.35 If the Schweinfurt 
raids had long-range fighter escorts it would have 
alleviated some of the pressure off of the bombers 
and likely reduced the number of casualties as 
well. 
After the disastrous Schweinfurt raids, Eaker 
immediately ordered that all unescorted daylight 
bombing raids deep into German air space be 
suspended.36 The Americans would wait until 
long-range fighter escorts were available and 
"good weather made the raids viable."37 It would 
be several months before the Eighth Air force 
could resume its strategic  bombing campaign. 
During this time, Ira Eaker was relieved of his 
duty as commander of the Eighth Air Force and 
was sent to take command of air operations in the 
Mediterranean.38 Eaker's replacement was Major 
General James Doolittle. During the first year that 
Doolittle took over as commander of the Eight Air 
force, the issues that prevented the implementation 
of long-range fighter escorts began to be solved. 
American productivity was increasing, the battle 
of the Atlantic was turning in favor of the Allies 
which made it easier to ship goods produced in 
America to England, and drop tanks to extend the 
range of fighters were produced and tested in 
1943.39   Perhaps a contributing factor to the long 
amount of time that it took to develop long-range 
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fighter escorts was the amount of money invested 
into the air force. According to the United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey, the United States only 
allocated 35% of its war production to its air force, 
in comparison to 40-50% for Britain and 40% for 
Germany.40 
Finally, on the 20th of February, 1944, during 
'Operation Argument,' also known as 'Big Week,' 
the Eighth Air Force was ready to test out their 
new bombing strategy; bombers escorted by P-38 
Lightnings, P-47  Thunderbolts,  and P-51 
Mustangs.  Big Week was a massive combined 
operation between the United States Strategic Air 
Forces (USSTAF) and the RAF. "More than 
3,800 USSTAF bombers and 2,351 from RAF 
bomber command dropped between them nearly 
20,000 tons of bombs on German fighter factories 
and associated industries, the British at night, the 
Americans by day."41    The purpose of Big Week 
was to do as much damage to the Luftwaffe as 
possible by trying to prevent future aircraft from 
being built and shooting down existing aircraft. 
The Americans and the British were relentless in 
their attacks during Big Week.  "For six straight 
days,  massive  attacks  against  enemy  aircraft 
facilities and twelve synthetic oil plants resulted in 
225 Luftwaffe pilots dead and 141 wounded."42 
The reason why the Luftwaffe casualty rate was so 
high during Big Week is because P-51s and P-47s 
now provided long range escort or bombers and 
while doing so they were given permission to fly 
ahead  to  search  out  and  destroy  any  enemy 
aircraft.  "The German losses during Big Week 
equates to about one tenth of their interceptor 
pilots."43    The loss rates for the Americans were 
not low either.   The Eighth Air Force lost 254 
bombers,44     which  equates  to  a  loss  rate  of 
approximately 6.7%.  While this is significantly 
lower  than  what  was  expected,  this  is  still  a 
significant loss. Even though Bombers taking 
part in raids during Big Week did have fighter 
escorts, their loss rates were still above the early 
war rate of what was sustainable by almost two 
percent. At  this  point  in  the  war,  aircraft 
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production was significantly higher than it was in 
the first two years of the war, so the sustainability 
rate was likely higher as well. Still, the fact that 
even though they had fighter escorts and they still 
suffered a loss rate above five percent shows that 
the safety of bombers could not be guaranteed. 
However, the fact that the loss rate of Big Week 
was over twelve percent less than the loss rate of 
Schweinfurt shows the impact that fighter escorts 
had on reducing the loss rate of bombers. It is also 
important to remember that Big Week was a 
week-long event consisting of many raids, 
whereas the Schweinfurt raids were two large 
scale raids over two days with several months 
separating the two. With a sufficient number of 
long-range fighter escorts equipped with drop 
tanks now in service, the USAAF decided to 
launch attacks on Berlin. The USAAF launched 
several raids on Berlin in a little over a year, 
including one on March 6th, 1944 and another on 
March 24th, 1945. The outcomes of these raids 
varied. 
On the March 6th raid, the Americans launched 
660 bombers which were escorted by P-47 
Thunderbolts and P-51 Mustangs.45 The bombers 
and fighters of the USAAF encountered heavy 
resistance from Luftwaffe fighters and lost sixty- 
nine heavy bombers, which is a loss rate of 
approximately 10.5%. The March 24th raid on 
Berlin went a little more smoothly in terms of 
keeping losses low. Despite encountering as many 
as thirty Me 262 jet fighters, which were much 
faster than the P-51 Mustang, the more agile 
Mustangs were able to defend the bombers and 
keep 139 of the 148 bombers safe, which 
translates to a loss rate of approximately 6.1%.46 
Both raids had fighter escorts, yet there were 
approximately 4.4% more bombers lost during the 
first raid. This shows that while fighters did help 
to keep loss rates down, luck was also a 
contributing factor. 
In the last few months of the War, the Allies 
bombed the German city of Dresden. It is true 
that during the last few months of the war the 
Allies had air superiority and Germany was 
quickly losing the war. According to David 
Irving, however, this did not make Dresden an 
easy target. "The fighter force was indeed 
numerically diminishing, and the fighter crews 
were tired and reaching breaking point. But the 
area that they were required to defend was also 
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39, 38. 
rapidly shrinking, and the invading armies rolled 
the Reich frontiers further and further into 
Germany."47 Dresden was also an important city 
to Germany during the war. Contrary to popular 
belief, Dresden was a strategic military target. 
Dresden was a transportation hub, a node for 
resupply and sustainment for the eastern front, a 
communications hub, an armed camp, a host of 
several factories which produced goods for the 
German war effort, and it stood in the way of the 
Russian advance into East Germany.48 
Dresden was bombed relentlessly by both the 
RAF and the Eighth Air Force. The RAF made 
the first two bombing runs over Dresden, and 
successfully completed their mission without even 
encountering a single enemy fighter. Fighters 
were fueled and ready to go, sitting on an air field 
only five miles away; however, they were never 
given the order to take off as communications in 
and out of Dresden were jammed, which was the 
work of specialized RAF planes outfitted with 
equipment capable of jamming radar.49 The 
Eighth Air Force was given the task of completing 
the third bombing run of Dresden. The American 
bombing run was "the third blow to the city within 
fourteen hours."50 
Although Dresden had already been hit hard, 
the Americans had a bit less luck on their side than 
the RAF. While the RAF was able to bomb their 
targets without opposition from enemy fighters 
due to communication problems, the Eighth Air 
Force bombers encountered several German Fw 
190s. The Fw 190 was second in performance 
only to the Me 262 jet fighter, and was more than 
capable of taking down a B-17 flying fortress. 
"The 356th Fighter Group had an encounter near 
Chemnitz (about 35 miles outside of Dresden), 
during which P-51s claimed one enemy aircraft 
shot down from a pack of twelve Fw 190s."51   The 
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356th then had another encounter with several Fw 
190s. The following is from a report of the 
encounter which, according to Taylor, was filed 
immediately after the Dresden raid: "At 12:35 3 
Fw 190s were observed to make a pass at a bomb 
group to which 356 was not assigned. One flight 
attacked the enemy aircraft.…These e/a may also 
be the ones reported by a bomb group as attacking 
them  in  the  target  area."52 This  shows  the 
effectiveness of long-range fighter escorts. A 
group of B-17 flying Fortresses would not stand a 
chance  against  a  Fw  190;  however,  the  P-51 
Mustang was a superior aircraft to the Fw 190, and 
the 356th  fighter group, in their P-51 Mustangs, 
were able to protect bomber formations during the 
Dresden raids and even score a kill.  There was 
only one reported American bomber lost during 
the Dresden raid.53    Given the fact that a bomber 
formation had been attacked by a group of Fw 
190s,  had  the  Dresden  raids  not  had  fighter 
escorts,  the  loss  rates  could  have  been  quite 
different. When Bernard Boylan is discussing the 
lack of long-range fighter escorts in the early years 
of the war, he states: "That this problem was not 
solved before 1941 is to be regarded as the most 
serious error in the pre-war planning of the AA."54 
There is no denying that long-range fighter 
escorts made a significant impact on the Allied 
daylight bombing effort during the Second World 
War.  While they did not really affect RAF loss 
rates as they had switched to night raids fairly 
early  in  the  war,  long-range  fighter  escorts 
drastically reduced the loss rates during daylight 
bombing raids.  The Eighth Air Force went from 
suffering loss rates upwards of twenty percent, to 
suffering loss rates under seven percent, and in 
some cases even under one percent.  However, it 
is  important  to  know  that  having  long-range 
fighter escorts was not a guarantee of safety. Big 
Week illustrated that it was possible to incur high 
loss rates even with fighter escorts. The reverse is 
also true, not having fighter escorts was not a 
guarantee of high loss rates either, as illustrated by 
the statistics of the Hamburg raids.  Clearly, luck 
was also a big factor in Allied bombing raids. 
However, it is clear that having long-range fighter 
escorts drastically increased the odds of incurring 
low loss rates. 
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